Welcome to Osamu Muramoto, MD, MA Personal Website
Welcome to Osamu Muramoto, MD, MA Personal Website
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Hello, my Name is Osamu “Sam” Muramoto
Hello, my Name is Osamu “Sam” Muramoto
I am a retired neurologist, a perpetual student, and a researcher of bioethics and philosophy. This website is for publishing my work and blog, mainly on bioethics and related areas.
Research Area, Work in Progress, Publications
Research Area, Work in Progress, Publications
My current academic focus is bioethics of brain death, brain death determination, and end-of-life care, which includes life heading to death, or Sein-zum-Tode.
My current academic focus is bioethics of brain death, brain death determination, and end-of-life care, which includes life heading to death, or Sein-zum-Tode.
Following are three recent papers on brain death. I welcome your feedback.
Following are three recent papers on brain death. I welcome your feedback.
Previous publications in ethics and neuroscience-related papers are in Google Scholar and PhilPapers. Links are at the bottom of this page.
Previous publications in ethics and neuroscience-related papers are in Google Scholar and PhilPapers. Links are at the bottom of this page.
Ethical Controversy Surrounding the Revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act in the United States
Ethical Controversy Surrounding the Revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act in the United States
Abstract
Abstract
This chapter reviews fundamental ethical controversy surrounding the ongoing effort to revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act in the United States. Instead of focusing on the process of the revision itself, the chapter explores the underlying ethical debate over brain death that has been ongoing for many decades and finally culminated in this revision. Three issues are focused: the requirement for consent and personal exemptions before applying brain death for the diagnosis of death; redefining the areas of the brain that have ceased to function in the definition of brain death; and codifying the American Academy of Neurology as the authority to issue the standards of the diagnosis of brain death. The chapter concludes that allowing the personal choice of death determination gives a pragmatic compromise to the disputed definition and practice of diagnosing brain death. So long as all risks and imperfections of the diagnosis are accepted through the consenting process, there is nothing ethically objectionable to continuing the current practice of diagnosing brain death as a successful tool to facilitate heart-beating organ donation without violating the dead-donor rule. By contrast, precluding personal choice and imposing legal restrictions to consent and exemptions would further erode public trust.
In Peter A. Clark (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Clinical Bioethics. London: Intech Open.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.1002031 (2023)
Critical analysis of three arguments against consent requirement for the diagnosis of brain death
Critical analysis of three arguments against consent requirement for the diagnosis of brain death
This is a work in progress. I welcome your feedback.
Abstract
In modern hospitals in developed countries, deaths are determined usually after a prearranged schedule of resuscitative efforts. By default, death is diagnosed and determined after “full code” or after the failure of intensive resuscitation. In end-of-life contexts, however, various degrees of less-than-full resuscitation and sometimes no resuscitation are allowed after the consent and shared decision-making of the patient and/or surrogates. The determination of brain death is a unique exception in these contexts because such an end-of-life care plan is usually not offered until after brain death is declared. This essay analyzes and critiques three arguments for denying the family and/or surrogate a chance to consent to or forego the diagnostic protocol of brain death and choose an alternative end-of-life plan. First, opponents of consent for the determination of brain death argue that presenting it as a selectable end-of-life plan undermines the integrity of death determination. The second argument is that it is inconsistent to allow foregoing the determination of brain death when the determination of circulatory death is non-negotiable. The third argument is that allowing the patient/surrogate to forego the determination of brain death would jeopardize the fair and appropriate utilization of intensive care resources and potentially reduce organ donor pools. After closer conceptual examinations of these three arguments, this essay concludes that these arguments are conceptually and morally problematic. It defends an alternative patient-centered end-of-life care plan based on consent and shared decision-making.
Is informed consent required for the diagnosis of brain death regardless of consent for organ donation?
Is informed consent required for the diagnosis of brain death regardless of consent for organ donation?
Abstract
In the half-century history of clinical practice of diagnosing brain death, informed consent has seldom been considered until very recently. Like many other medical diagnoses and ordinary death pronouncements, it has been taken for granted for decades that brain death is diagnosed and death is declared without consideration of the patient’s advance directives or family’s wishes. This essay examines the pros and cons of using informed consent before the diagnosis of brain death from an ethical point of view. As shared decision-making in clinical practice became increasingly indispensable, respect for the patients’ autonomous wishes regarding how to end their lives has a significant role in deciding how death is diagnosed. Brain death, as a fully technologically controlled death, may require a different ethical framework from the old one for traditional cardiac death. With emerging and proliferating options in end-of-life care for those who suffer from catastrophic brain injury, the traditional reasoning that ‘death gives no choice, hence no consent’ requires another examination. Patients facing imminent brain death now have options other than undergoing the diagnostic workup for brain death, such as donation after circulatory death and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment with maximum comfort measures for death with dignity. Nevertheless, just as in the debate over opt-in versus opt-out organ donation policies, informed consent before the diagnosis of brain death faces fierce opposition from consequentialists urging the expansion of the donor pool. This essay examines these objections and provides constructive replies along with a proposal to accommodate this morally required consent.
Journal of medical ethics, 47(12), e5. Advance online publication (Open access) https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2020-106240 (2020)
Informed consent for the diagnosis of brain death: a conceptual argument
Informed consent for the diagnosis of brain death: a conceptual argument
Abstract
Background: This essay provides an ethical and conceptual argument for the use of informed consent prior to the diagnosis of brain death. It is meant to enable the family to make critical end-of-life decisions, particularly withdrawal of life support system and organ donation, before brain death is diagnosed, as opposed to the current practice of making such decisions after the diagnosis of death. The recent tragic case of a 13-year-old brain-dead patient in California who was maintained on a ventilator for over 2 years illustrates how such a consent would have made a crucial difference. Methods: Conceptual, philosophical, and ethical analysis. Results: I first consider a conceptual justification for the use of consent for certain non-beneficial and unwanted medical diagnoses. I suggest that the diagnosis of brain death falls into this category for some patients. Because the diagnostic process of brain death lacks the transparency of traditional death determination, has a unique epistemic structure and a complex risk-benefit profile which differs markedly from case to case, and presents conflicts of interest for physicians and society, I argue that pre-diagnostic counseling and informed consent should be part of the diagnostic process. This approach can be termed as “allow cardiac death”, whose parallel logic with “allow natural death” is discussed. I also discuss potential negative impacts on organ donation and health care cost from this proposal and offer possible mitigation. I show that the pre-diagnostic counseling can improve the possibility for well-thought-out decisions regarding organ donation and terminating life-support system in cases of hopeless prognosis. This approach differs conceptually from the pluralism of the definition of death, such as those in New Jersey and Japan, and it upholds the Uniform Determination of Death Act. Conclusions: My intention is not to provide an instant panacea for the ongoing impasse of the brain death debate, but to point to a novel conceptual ground for a more pragmatic, and more patient- and family-centered approach. By enabling the family to consent to or decline the diagnostic process of brain death, but not to choose the definition of death, it upholds the current legal definition of death.
Philosophy Ethics and Humanities in Medicine, 11(1), 8. (Open access) https://doi.org/10.1186/s13010-016-0042-4
List of previous publications on Google Scholar
List of previous publications on Google Scholar
List of previous publications on PhilPapers
List of previous publications on PhilPapers
Blog on the Medium
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